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Introduction 
In the previous chapter this book has clarified the main debates regarding 
secession, recognition and the unrecognised states. This book highlights the 
inherent flaws of assessments of secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet 
space through the lens of ‘frozen conflicts’ due to a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the terminology implies a static nature of conflict over time. 
Secondly, it is inappropriate to describe the post-conflict period in terms of a 
conflict that has ended once the ceasefire has been signed. Thirdly, the focus 
on conflict implies a research agenda centred on the issue of violence that 
eludes the way in which important political and economic aspects of the 
post-war environments have been dealt with. Fourthly, the frozen conflicts 
terminology does not imply much about the secessionist nature of these 
conflicts. The consequence of using this terminology has been research that 
treats all cases from the post-Soviet space as similar, eluding the possibility 
of comparing interactive processes between former combatants in the post- 
war environment. Whilst the literature on ‘frozen conflicts’ has evolved 
towards a better understanding of unrecognised states as subjects for re-
search per se, the tendency to study them as disparate entities has in turn 
missed the most important aspects of the evolution in relations between de- 
facto states and their metropolitan counterparts. Hence, this book proposes 
an understanding of conditions of incomplete secession as more adequate in 
exploring the post-conflict environments of the post-Soviet space. This is 
because the conditions of incomplete secession allow for an understanding 
of the dynamism of the post-war environment, especially as the third con-
dition clearly refers to the existence of a long-term dynamic relationship 
between metropolitan and de-facto state. 
In this chapter, this relationship will be accounted for through the concept 
of political order under conditions of incomplete secession. A conceptual 
framework that will serve towards the core analysis of three empirical case 
studies will be proposed. This conceptual framework outlines an under-
standing of political order as based on two dimensions: The first dimension 
refers to three functional domains represented by security, governance and 
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politics whilst the second dimension refers to the changing level of intensity 
of antagonism from mutual accommodation to chronic stalemate and from 
chronic stalemate to acute confrontation. 
The study of political order 
A rich body of academic scholarship has addressed the relationships be-
tween various governments and their challengers and made different uses of 
the concept of political order have been developed by political scientists 
(Fukuyama, 2011; Huntington and Fukuyama, 1996; Wissenburg, 2009), 
economists (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009) and scholars concerned with 
peace and conflict (Barma, 2017; Mikulan Kildi and Cepoi, 2017; 
Richmond, 2016; Staniland, 2012; Sullivan, 2016; Thakur and Venugopal, 
2018; Weigand, 2015). The objective guiding the conceptual rethinking 
within this book refers to the need for further understanding of continuity 
and change in conditions of incomplete secession in the post-Soviet space. 
To outline the conceptual framework proposed by this book, the fol-
lowing section will engage with the various foundations and uses of the 
concept of political order. It seeks to introduce the concept of political order 
under conditions of incomplete secession to incorporate the interactions 
between metropolitan and de-facto states in the political, governance and 
security arenas. The purpose of the following sections is to explore various 
conceptualisation of ‘political order’ as well as the uses of this concept to 
describe different types of domestic ordered relationships between govern-
ments and their challengers. Working towards a definition of political order 
that can ensure the analysis of the role of elections in shaping the different 
levels of intensity in the interactions between metropolitan and de-facto 
states across functional domains – a task that will be carried out in the third 
part of this book – this chapter also takes into account the various meth-
odological choices made by scholars towards understanding the concept of 
political order in conflict-torn spaces either as a dependent or independent 
variable. 
Order, violence and the centrality of the state 
When addressing the relationship between violence and order, North, Wallis 
and Weingast (2009) emphasise the power of individuals in managing dif-
ferent forms of violent acts through personal interactions as well as the way 
in which institutions frame the rules by which violence is deterred. Thus, 
when looking at the way in which a society is organised to limit violence, the 
use of the concept of ‘open access orders’ relies on Weber’s understanding 
that states possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Furthermore, 
this concept serves for an understanding of how various aspects of the state 
contribute to the development of a logic for controlling violence. This 
particular logic points towards the importance of the political system, the 
Post-conflict political order 3 
role of the military and police forces as well as that of political parties in 
limiting violence – all three elements representing key parts of an institu-
tional framework designed to enforce order by limiting the use of violence 
arising from different non-state actors (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). 
As different concepts of order have been used in the literature to address the 
role of the state in managing the use of force, one should also consider the use 
of the concept of political order to describe other forms of authority than the 
top-down hierarchy of a state functioning alongside the Weberian monopoly 
of the legitimate use of force. As Weigand (2015) points out, there is an in-
creased attention to the utility of the concept of order for an understanding of 
settings that fall outside this traditional view of statehood. Indeed, when using 
such a lens, ‘one usually looks at cities within a province, provinces within a 
state and states within the regional and global order. Thereby, particularly the 
role of the state is emphasised. This certainly makes sense as our world is 
organised in de jure states’ (Weigand, 2015, p. 5). When the state is never-
theless ravaged by conflict that comes with attempted secession, one has to 
acknowledge a different type of political order, one that is being built through 
interactions between the politics of secession and that of counter-secession. 
These aspects challenge the traditional view of statehood and question the 
validity of the state-centric and hierarchical lenses that dominate the under-
standing of political order. 
Wissenburg (2009) distinguishes between the traditional model of top- 
down hierarchical political order, where the desire for unity and cooperation 
are normal and secession is an ambiguous phenomenon waiting to be ex-
plained. He stresses that: ‘On the pluralist view, oversimplifying this per-
spective as well, order is created bottom-up, voluntarily or involuntarily, by 
individuals and their (in)voluntary associations, in response to the perceived 
needs and interests of an order’s constituent parts’ (Wissenburg, 2009, p. 2). 
The bottom-up approach talks about individuals merged in associations 
and shared interests building a unique kind of order. Wissenburg highlights 
the way in which what we now consider modern republics are actually built on 
historical provinces, thus pointing out to a challenge to the more traditional 
way of viewing political order as a top-down imposition (Wissenburg, 2009). 
This concern with the modern state is also addressed in Political order and 
Political Decay, which looks at the way in which political order often be-
comes the subject of various processes of change that occur either as a result 
of revolution or reform (Huntington and Fukuyama, 1996). Such form of 
change is viewed as arising in the context of a multiplicity of ideas and actors 
that contend for authority. As Fukuyama (2011, pp. 152–153) argues in 
relation to this conceptualisation: 
Political order emerges as a result of the achievement of some 
equilibrium among the contending forces within a society. But as time 
goes on, change occurs internally and externally: the actors who 
established the original equilibrium themselves evolve or disappear; 
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new actors appear; economic and social conditions shift; the society is 
invaded from the outside or faces new terms of trade or imported ideas. 
As a result, the preceding equilibrium no longer holds, and political 
decay results until the existing actors come up with a new set of rules 
and institutions to restore order.  
Traditionally, debates related to the ideas and actors that represent the 
contenting forces within a given society have been carried out with regards 
to the state as one of the institutions contributing to the embodiment of 
political order alongside the rule of law and accountable government. 
Modern liberal democracy is thus often identified as combining these in-
stitutions and offering political order its legitimacy when they are viewed as 
being able to protect people’s interests (Fukuyama, 2011). 
Political order and war to peace transitions 
Whilst the concept of political order has often been used in relationship to 
the state, one should take into account that the occurrence of conflict and 
the existence of other forms of unrecognised authority as a result of different 
forms of conflict renders the focus on the state as an institution of political 
order as conceptually unfit for a comprehensive understanding of polities 
that do not correspond to the visions of states as homogenous spaces of 
authority such as conflict-torn spaces which do not exhibit a legitimate 
monopoly of the use of force (Weigand, 2015). To understand this situation, 
a different strand of research has accounted for a particular type of political 
order that focuses on interactions between multiple holders of authority in 
the absence of a top-down enforced monopoly on violence. 
In the context of war to peace transitions – where ‘formal rules, policy 
structures, and norms – are the cornerstone of this political order’ (Barma, 
2017, p. 44), understanding the role of the institutions that embody political 
order requires us to account for the fact that ‘these institutions are the le-
gacies of the concrete political struggles of the past and, in turn, provide the 
contours of the political arena of the present – shaping the incentives facing 
individuals and organisations, guiding the patterns in which they interact, 
and constraining their political behaviour’ (Barma, 2017, p. 44). 
This view assumes that political order in countries that have been ravaged 
by war is dynamic, characterised by intermediate levels in the ability of its 
leadership to control of violence, govern effectively and be democratic ac-
countable. According to this conceptualisation: ‘a political order is thus an 
institutional arrangement itself rather than a set of governance outcomes 
that are inherently desirable and the modifying adjective is crucial in telling 
us what kind of order we are talking about’ (Barma, 2017, p. 44). Similar in 
its focus on the post-conflict context, a distinctive conceptualisation of po-
litical order – as a dependent variable – addresses the dynamics of political 
order in conflict torn spaces that acknowledges the existence of multiple 
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authorities but also seeks to emphasise that legitimacy plays a key role in 
these dynamics as another source of authority enabling the exercise of social 
control besides force (Weigand, 2015). 
This particular emphasis supports the view that ‘no government ex-
clusively based on the means of violence has ever existed’ (Weigand, 2015, 
p. 14). Therefore, it is necessary to look beyond the exercise of authority in 
conflict torn spaces as a mere struggle between multiple actors to control the 
means of coercion, as indeed is suggested by the concept of wartime political 
orders discussed above. Consequently, Weigand (2015) highlights the dis-
tinction between two ideal-typical sources of authority that take the form of 
legitimacy consolidation and the ability to use force. This concept rests on 
the assumption ‘that both force and legitimacy may enable an authority to 
exercise social control, constituting two, not mutually exclusive but closely 
linked sources of authority’ (Weigand, 2015, p. 14). 
Furthermore, the term ‘authority’ is used to describe social control in 
terms of both the relationship of obedience between a particular actor and 
the people whose lives it affects as well as the specific characteristics of the 
entity that exercises a structuring influence on the lives of these individuals. 
Weigand (2015) distinguishes between the two dimensions of social control – 
‘the exercise of force’ and the ‘possession of legitimacy’ – thus bridging the 
gap between conceptual approaches that identify the source of obedience. 
These are found either in the ability of the entity to exercise violence and 
thus coercively exercise authority through the monopolisation of force or in 
the voluntarily entered relationship between the entity and the individuals 
over which it exercises control. This second dimension is therefore important 
to understand the benefits of accounting for legitimacy in the empirical 
analysis of the dynamic political order in conflict-torn spaces. As the author 
suggests, there are multiple considerations to be made when mapping le-
gitimacy in this context. Firstly, the specific features of the entity exercising 
authority should be considered as they may be linked to the perception of 
legitimacy they convey among the governed population. These features in-
clude their ideological characteristics, the history and means of obtaining 
authority and the daily behaviour in relation to the population. Secondly, 
the analysis should specify whether legitimacy is to be explored either in 
terms of a perception of legitimacy among the population – bottom-up, 
justification of legitimacy from the authority perspective – top-down or 
both. Thirdly, when a bottom-up approach on analysing legitimacy per-
ceptions is taken, distinctions should be made both between the perception 
of different groups as well as the different degrees of belief in such legitimacy 
(Weigand, 2015). 
It should be noted that a concern for the legitimacy is shared across 
studies concerned with the concept of political order. Questions related to 
the legitimacy of actors involved in negotiating power and the exercise of 
authority in the context of incomplete secession are thus addressed by this 
book through a concern with the way in which electoral process in both 
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metropolitan and de-facto states might contribute to a parallel process of 
legitimisation that in turn leads to escalation. As it will be explored in the 
rest of the chapter and throughout this book, understanding the conflict- 
cooperation continuum between metropolitan and de-facto states in the 
aftermath of ceasefire is crucial. 
Paul Staniland (2012) has sought to account for the particular types of 
ordered relations that emerge out of violent conflict between states and in-
surgents, fluctuating between different degrees of conflict and cooperation. 
Staniland makes a valuable contribution to research concerned with intrastate 
conflict dynamics in that he explores the variation in political orders ac-
cording to the distribution of territorial control and the level of cooperation 
between states and insurgents in civil wars. Based on this variable he distin-
guishes between ‘segmented distribution of control in which each side controls 
some territory, and situations with an over-lapping, fragmented distribution 
of control in which both sides have presence throughout the area under 
contestation’ (Staniland, 2012, p. 247). Under such typologies, he explores the 
patterns of cooperation and conflict between armed contenders in the context 
of ‘dual power’ struggles that are fundamentally shaped by the political re-
lationship between states and insurgents. Where the distribution of authority 
is segmented, the level of activity in state-insurgents cooperation can lead to 
orders characterised by shared sovereignty, spheres of influence or clashing 
monopolies. Where territorial control is fragmented, the ordering of authority 
distribution and exercise leads to collusion, tacit coexistence or guerrilla dis-
order. These subtypes of wartime political order can be observed in various 
cases of South Asian conflicts. For example, an indication of shared sover-
eignty can be observed in the minimisation of violence between Burmese 
authorities and insurgents on the basis of negotiated arrangements and in the 
absence of formal political settlements. At the other end of the spectrum, 
clashing monopolies are characteristic of the case of the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan state, representing two territorially 
segmented armed forces fighting across conventional battle lines in order to 
determine the limits of control and (Staniland, 2012). 
This conceptual framework is useful for the current research for one 
important reason. Through its focus on particular types of actors that 
compete for authority it provides an example of how political order can be 
used to describe complex social interactions in the absence of the monopoly 
on violence being held by the state. This represents a similar situation to the 
one in which political order evolves towards separate political authority and 
territorial control between different entities, namely the central government 
and the unrecognised state. Nevertheless, one should also consider that 
Staniland uses the concept of ‘wartime political orders’ as an independent 
variable and argues that ‘these wartime political orders in turn shape pat-
terns of violence against civilians, governance and economics, and post-war 
politics’ (Staniland, 2012, p. 243). 
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This chapter seeks to move beyond an understanding of processes of in-
teraction between the government and other contenders to authority as 
being linked solely to the security arena and proposes an analysis of post- 
ceasefire rather than wartime political orders. The concept of political order 
under conditions of incomplete secession proposed by this book relies on a 
methodological understanding that interactions between metropolitan and 
de-facto states can be assessed as a dependent variable, namely a particular 
outcome that can be influenced by a variety of factors. However, one should 
consider the diversity of methodological choices arising from scholarly 
works dealing with the study of various cases of conflicts across the world 
through different conceptualisations of political order that have been dis-
cussed in this chapter. The aim of this section is to provide the basis for the 
conceptual contribution of this book, by refining and building on the ex-
isting understandings of political order. In this sense, this book takes into 
account that when the ‘no war-no peace’ (Ginty, 2006) conceptualisation is 
applied to the specific context of incomplete succession characteristic to the 
post-Soviet space, a key aspect that differentiates the type of political order 
being pursued by these competing actors is that it represents the product of 
two competing types of politics: That of secession and that of counter- 
secession (Muro, 2018). These types of politics as we shall see in this book 
present elements of continuity and change, following on from the past 
struggles of the secessionist wars of the 1990s, pointing out to the challenges 
of identifying a clear-cut ending to the struggle for independence in the post- 
Soviet space. 
Post-conflict political order under conditions of incomplete 
secession 
The common aspect underpinning the conceptual approaches discussed 
above is represented by a departure from a state centric emphasis on the 
exercise of authority in conflict affected spaces, and the acknowledgment 
that specific forms of order can occur as a result of a contest for power 
between a multiplicity of actors that evolve out of the absence of a clear 
monopoly on the use of force. This underlining approach is based on a 
particular post-Weberian understanding of statehood, order and power, 
suggesting that the concept of political order can be beneficial for exploring 
the dynamics of competition between different claimants to authority, 
within conflict-affected spaces (Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage, 1994; 
Schlichte, 2005). Whereas for Weber (1965) the state represents the sole 
guarantor of security and sovereignty, in situations of incomplete secession 
these aspects are constantly under challenge from different holders of power. 
The present research builds upon this particular approach towards a better 
understanding of contexts of incomplete secession within which authority is 
constantly negotiated between multiple actors within metropolitan and de- 
facto states. Towards this end it engages with existing conceptualisations 
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discussed earlier in order to explore the process of interactive exercise of 
authority between these multiple actors that involve both the use of force and 
the accumulation and struggle for legitimacy by metropolitan and de-facto 
state alike. In the absence of war, the multi-level interactions between me-
tropolitan and de-facto states can offer an insight into the relationship be-
tween the centres of power in the two entities that forms the basis of political 
order. 
Coming back to the focus of inquiry of this book, in order to understand 
what the lack of political settlement in cases of incomplete secession means for 
an understanding of violence, power and order in the aftermath of secessionist 
war the concept of political order under conditions of incomplete secession 
proposed by this book relies on an understanding that interactions between 
metropolitan and de-facto states can be assessed as a particular outcome 
specific to post-conflict environments in which the transformation undergone 
by the de-facto states from rebel parties to functioning state-builders seeking 
international recognition has been influenced by a variety of factors. It is 
important to emphasise the benefits of conceptualising political order towards 
analysing these transformations in relation to the aftermath of conflict. In the 
context of incomplete secession, the various interactions between metropolitan 
and de-facto state have been geared towards traditional post-conflict objectives 
related primarily to the search for security and the stabilisation of governance 
structures and service provision (Berdal, 2009). 
The most important issue in this context is constituted by the post-war 
aim of both entities to build a functioning political order, with the me-
tropolitan state aiming for a type of constitutional deal that would guar-
antee its territorial integrity and the de-facto state striving for independence 
and recognition at the international level. Where the search for a constitu-
tional arrangement is affected by the incompatible goals of primary parties 
seeking to defend their war gains, it is important to consider a series of 
aspects. This incompatibility in aims throughout the post-war period makes 
the process of escalation through different means a complex issue that af-
fects not only security interactions between former warrying parties but also 
their political and governance relations. 
As it seeks to move away from the main focus of studying conflicts to-
wards the comprehensive study of political order and power after secessio-
nist war has ended, this understanding does not elude the role of violence in 
the aftermath of war. Indeed, an understanding of the changing level of 
intensity of antagonism acknowledges different levels of violence in the se-
curity arena that range from dispute to non-violent crisis, violent crisis and 
severe crisis. In this sense, the conceptual lens of this book seeks to con-
tribute to studies of post-war violence that have pointed out that: ‘The end 
of war very rarely, if ever, makes a definitive break with past patterns of 
violence’ (Berdal and Suhrke, 2012). Furthermore, as it has been argued, 
post-war environments are replete with a certain culture of violence where 
the forms and targets of attacks suggest that violence is nether isolated 
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neither perpetrated by the ‘pockets of dead-enders’ un-reconciled with the 
new post-war order. Under such circumstances it was argued that there is a 
certain function in post-war violence as well as a way of understanding it as 
a coping strategy in the face of state weakness and the disintegration of state 
authority. It is indeed this specificity of the post-war environment in which 
the new rules of political order are articulated that makes what has been 
termed the ‘political economy of violence’ an important feature of post-war 
environments (Keen, 1998). The lens of this book is broader in its con-
ceptual scope as the analysis will look at post-war violence but also at the 
wider antagonism between the parties. The conceptual framework discussed 
in this chapter provides more clarity to the study of authority exercise in the 
context of state contestation by moving away from the broader concern with 
secessionist wars to the study of power relationships in the absence of 
political settlement. 
Thus, in distinguishing between various uses of the concept of order ex-
plored in this chapter and political order under incomplete secession, this 
book seeks to provide an analytical tool for moving away from violence- 
centric analysis to a study that seeks to place the focus on power relation-
ships. A series of studies related to the three cases under discussion have 
looked at the dynamics of war resurgence, nevertheless eluding the possi-
bility of understanding the complexity of power relationships for long per-
iods of time between the early 1990s and the late 2000s (Wennmann, 2006; 
George, 2010). The conceptual framework thus corrects this existing gap 
and adds to the existing literature that has looked at the aftermath of 
conflict as replete with particular challenges and opportunities. Among such 
studies it is important to consider the contribution of research that has 
proposed theoretical arguments related to the transformation of rebel lea-
ders into functioning state-builders. As Sindre (2019, p. 486) argues with 
regards to former rebel parties seeking self- determination: 
Their emphasis on ethno-territorial identities as the basis for their 
struggle is a core feature of their ideology, suggesting reliance on 
exclusionary ideals and a restrictive interpretation of the ethnic com-
munity. However, as most conflicts over self-determination rarely end 
with the manifestation of new states, most former secessionist move-
ments continue to mobilize as political parties in regional- or national- 
level politics or both after war has ended.  
This leads to a better understanding of political order in the aftermath of 
secession attempts as it is based on the study of temporal and qualitative 
changes in the nature of security, governance and political interactions be-
tween metropolitan and de-facto states. In particular it takes into account 
one of the dominant themes that has emerged in the study of secessionist 
conflict in the post-Soviet space, namely democratisation and its relationship 
to conflict and sovereignty, aspects which will be discussed later in the book. 
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Furthermore, one should not neglect two additional themes that are helpful 
for qualifying the study of these processes specifically with regards to elec-
tions in metropolitan and de-facto sates as causes of escalation that will be 
addressed in the empirical analysis of this book. 
Thus, as this book is concerned with the factors that can explain escala-
tion between different levels of intensity of antagonism in the political, 
governance and security arenas of post-conflict political order in these si-
tuations, this chapter proposes a nuanced understanding of this process with 
reference to the post-soviet space. As existing research has shown escalation 
represents a dynamic manifestation of conflict and negotiation represents a 
process of combing divergent agendas into a common acceptable position 
(Zartman and Faure, 2005). Studies related to peacebuilding in post-conflict 
societies have dealt extensively with the issue potential causes of escalation 
and the failure of conflict resolution initiatives. 
A first set of arguments has been proposed with regard to the importance of 
structural factors such as the weakness of state structures, the security concerns 
of different groups within a country and the particular ethnic geography of a 
territory in providing the favourable terrain for conflict. William Zartman has 
argued that violence may occur under such conditions when the state can no 
longer manage societal demands (Zartman, 1995). Weak state institutions 
create a sense of heightened insecurity among groups and the potential for 
escalating security dilemmas once these groups start taking measures towards 
protecting themselves (Posen, 1993; Lischer, 1999). Furthermore, where the 
population is not ethnically homogenous, such inter-group cleavages may occur 
alongside ethnic lines thus further aggravating the domestic context (Sambanis, 
2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Similarly, when dealing with the relationship 
between democratisation and war Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder highlight 
the fact that due to the slow pace of democratisation, regimes undergoing such 
transitions – as was indeed the case in both Moldova and Georgia – become 
more prone to aggressive behaviour against potential enemies. Such tendencies 
are the result of settings where: ‘democratic control over foreign policy is 
partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite 
politics, and where democratization suffers reversals’ (Mansfield and Snyder, 
1995, p. 1). 
Thus it has been argued the emergence and consolidation of influential 
ideologies such as ethnic nationalism creates the potential for increased 
inter-group competition by denying the rights and freedoms of a targeted 
ethnic group and increasing the volatility of political systems (Harff, 2003; 
Horowitz, 2001; Rothschild, 1981). As both the African and Balkan contexts 
show, once nationalist appeal was used in leadership struggles among elites, 
political competition increased the chance of escalation rather than en-
couraging stability. As this book will show a discussion of these arguments 
with reference to the post-Soviet space can illuminate both their explanatory 
value as well as their particular application in these specific contexts. 
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Indeed, if considering a final set of arguments emerging from the peace-
building literature, the issue of spoilers in peace processes should be given 
further attention. Here a distinction should be made between arguments 
related to primary parties in the conflict acting as spoilers and external third 
parties preventing conflict resolution. With regards to the first set of argu-
ments it has been argued that the issue of actor fragmentation is particularly 
important for the success or failure in peace negotiations. As Cunningham 
(2011) points out in some cases the greater the number of factions that are 
part of self-determination movements the greater are the chances for a 
bargain with the state. However, fragmentation can also have the opposite 
effect in that one group may be particularly inclined to negotiate peace 
whilst another one might be inclined to use violence. As this book will show 
such information about the political agendas of self-determination move-
ments that emerges throughout electoral periods is particularly important 
for metropolitan states seeking changes in their counter-secessionist policies. 
This is particularly important if considering Stedman’s argument that the 
emergence of spoilers depends on how radical the goals of the rebel groups 
are (Stedman, 1997). In the context of negotiations between metropolitan 
and de-facto states such aspects are particularly important as the politics of 
counter-secession is often a reaction to how radical the secessionist goals of 
these entities have become. As Driscoll (2015) argues with regards to the end 
of civil wars the post-Soviet space, fragmentation matters in that it gives 
governments the chance to co-opt rebel leaders selectively into peace ne-
gotiations, thus making civil war settlement a ‘coalition formation game.’ 
This book seeks to account for the micro-dynamics of such process in 
Moldova and Georgia in order to distinguish between periods of time in 
which parties to the conflict were closer to settling their incompatibilities as 
well as the reasons behind the policy changes that have led to escalation. In 
doing so it does not elude the fact that in all three unresolved conflicts, 
whilst escalation has been the direct result of actions undertaken by me-
tropolitan and de-facto states, the role third parties acting as mediators but 
also external legitimisers has been important. These aspects will be discussed 
in more detail in the final part of this book. 
The two dimensions of political order 
Taking into account the above arguments this book argues that both ne-
gotiation and escalation are thus useful for understanding the concept of 
political order. The present research strives to explore the dynamics of po-
litical order under conditions of incomplete secession. In this sense, it sup-
ports the view that the dynamics of political order should be analysed in 
terms of both the processes of negotiation and escalation that occur between 
metropolitan and de-facto state in the absence of renewed war. Negotiation 
and escalation are part of all three realms of political order: The arena of 
interactions between political elites, the governance arena that is responsible 
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for the consolidation of arrangements for service provision and the security 
arena that shapes the interaction between law-enforcement actors. Firstly, 
negotiation can be present in all three functional domains when the level of 
intensity in antagonism between metropolitan and de-facto states is mutual 
accommodation and it can gradually break down through subsequent de-
cisions to pursue unilateral policies outside the negotiations frameworks. 
Secondly, whilst escalation primarily means an increase in the levels of 
violence, it is often accompanied by inflamed political actions as well as new 
measures to pursue alternative policies with regards to the governing of 
population that can ensure legitimacy gains for either of the parties. 
Political order, as defined in this book is thus constituted through two 
different dimensions: The first one is represented by the three functional 
domains in which interactions towards the exercise of authority by me-
tropolitan and de -facto states take place. These functional domains include 
the political, governance and security arenas. The second dimension pro-
vides an understanding of variation between the levels of intensity in the 
antagonism of interactions within each of these arenas. These levels of in-
tensity can be understood on a cooperation to conflict continuum as taking 
the form of mutual accommodation, chronic stalemate and acute con-
frontation. Within each arena, the relationship between the two entities 
fluctuates according to different markers of change that can be identified as 
the following: In the political arena, the interactions for the exercise of 
authority shift from reciprocity to rivalry and hostility; in the governance 
arena, the built-up of institutions belonging to metropolitan and de-facto 
states render the relationship between the two entities as changing from 
certain degrees of collaboration to competition and confrontation; finally in 
the security arena, the level of intensity in the use of violence can produce 
different degrees of antagonism between the law-enforcement actors of the 
two sides, ranging from dispute to non-violent and violent crises and even 
severe crises. 
Based on this conceptual framework that will be outlined in the remaining 
part of this chapter, this book argues that escalation affects all three func-
tional domains of political order. Escalation is understood in this book as 
the process by which gradual changes between different levels of intensity of 
antagonism occur across the functional domains of political order. This 
book focuses on observing these gradual changes by considering different 
key events that have been part of strengthening the politics of secession and 
counter-secession that has led to escalation. Towards this end, observing the 
different shifts in interactions between political elites, governing institutions 
and security actors belonging to metropolitan and de-facto states requires an 
understanding of the how the different markers of change in the level of 
intensity of antagonism characterise the process of escalation across func-
tional domains. Where this process has assumed an increase in the level of 
intensity of antagonism towards chronic stalemate analysis will focus on 
changes between political reciprocity to political rivalry, from collaborative 
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governance arrangements to competing ones and from low levels of violence 
such as disputes to increases towards non-violent and violent crises. Finally, 
where the process of escalation has involved an increase in level of intensity 
towards acute confrontation different observable changes will be explored to 
reveal new forms of interactions between metropolitan and de-facto states 
that include political hostility between elites, clashes between governance 
arrangements and the propensity for severe crises to dominate the re-
lationship between law-enforcement actors between the sides. As these 
changes represent broad patterns in the process of escalation, the analysis in 
each case study will focus on the specific events that pertain to shifts in 
interactions between metropolitan and de-facto states in each functional 
domain. This will serve towards a better understanding of how the process 
of escalation occurred in each functional domain at various points in time. 
The functional domains of political order 
To understand the first dimension of political order that takes the form of 
different functional domains, one should conceive of the complexity in-
herent in relationship between politics, governance and security. The three 
arenas discussed in this chapter sustain political order under conditions of 
incomplete secession as they provide various issues and channels of inter-
action between the metropolitan and de-facto states. Each of these arenas is 
important for a number of reasons: Firstly, they sustain a degree of con-
tinuity or change in the interactions between the parties. Secondly, they 
represent arenas where conflict and antagonism can be sustained and esca-
lated. Thirdly, they represent integral parts of the negotiating frameworks 
that have been set up and modified over the past two decades through both 
domestic decisions and the various actions of international mediators and 
actors, an aspect that will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of 
this book. 
The political arena 
Under conditions of incomplete secession, the political arena is dominated by 
the actions of political leaders and legislatures belonging to both metropolitan 
and de-facto states. The main issue dominating this arena is constituted by 
actions related to status, with actors expressing different positions towards the 
end-goal of status for the de-facto state. Within the political arena, elites 
sustain parallel claims to statehood through various political statements or 
events such as referenda. In addition, one should note the declaratory powers 
of Parliaments that often seek to promote long-term engagement with the 
issues of independence and territorial integrity. Thus, whereas leaders of 
metropolitan and de-facto states are often responsible for the political talks 
regarding status, delivering changing approaches, Parliaments contribute to 
the consolidation of long-term policies towards the issue of secession and 
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counter-secession. Here leaders and political elites may express a particular 
claim to statehood or policy towards the opposing party. Political landscapes 
in countries divided by war can often be affected by the way in which past 
atrocities are viewed and evolve. In the case of incomplete secession, wartime 
aims have a clear form in the post-conflict stage, and the politics of secession 
and counter-secession (Muro, 2018) become an additional layer of the way in 
which elites seek to govern. As it will be shown in the next chapters, these 
types of politics can dominate political debate and contribute to bringing to 
power nationalist leaders that favour escalatory policies. Whereas the election 
of a new leadership can bring about an important degree of change in the 
nature of status talks, it is also important to analyse the way in which con-
tinuity in the type of interactions towards the provision of services also 
contributes to the consolidation of particular types of relations that range 
from cooperation to conflict. Thus, this research will assess the particular 
events which are considered to represent instances of change: For example, 
political decisions related to negotiation with the opposing party taken by the 
Presidents and Parliaments of metropolitan and de-facto states. In addition, 
whilst institutions belonging to both entities express parallel claims to au-
thority through their actions in this arena, one can also notice a particular 
form of institutionalised political relations that is maintained through the 
formal mediation frameworks established in the aftermath of conflict. These 
often represents a channel of interaction between the leadership of the two 
entities, where the expression of incompatible aims shows changes in the level 
of antagonism between the parties that can range from political reciprocity to 
rivalry and hostility. These incompatible goals are territorial reintegration 
aimed by the metropolitan state and independence claims made by the de- 
facto state rather than any compromise solution. 
The governance arena 
Based on the above understanding of the political functional domain this 
book argues that de-facto states can strengthen the politics of secession by 
gradually challenging proposals for shared power. However, escalation oc-
curs when the response from metropolitan states is equally radical through 
the strengthening of the politics of counter-secession. This is particularly 
important as cross-case comparisons indicate various patterns of behaviour 
both by central governments and de-facto states. Indeed, in the case of 
metropolitan states escalation was the result of a process of de-legitimisation 
of de-facto states that involved not only a change in political discourse, but 
also specific actions related to the provision of services for the population 
living in these entities. 
Thus, whilst de-facto state have all tended to radicalise their positions at 
various points in time, seeking international recognition rather than federal 
solutions, the responses of the governments of Moldova and Georgia have 
differed significantly. As the leaders of de-facto states sought to increase their 
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popular legitimacy through independent referenda and elections between 2004 
and 2006, the condemnations of the respective central governments took 
various forms. Whilst Moldovan leaders sought to reform the negotiation 
frameworks with Transnistria, proposing a step by step cooperation plan that 
left out political talks, in Georgia, the government was more keen to establish 
its own control and authority in the de-facto states. In the case of Abkhazia 
this involved organising parallel elections as well as appealing to the popu-
lations in the de-facto state to support parallel governance institutions es-
tablished by the Georgian government. In South Ossetia whilst the response 
of the Georgian government was not equally radical in terms of the parallel 
authority structures, a continued effort by metropolitan state to curb the 
functioning of illicit cross-border economic activities suggests a tendency to-
wards de-legitimisation of the de-facto leadership that was meant to decrease 
its ability to maintain territorial and social control. 
Actions towards the revision of governing arrangements for the provision 
of services obtained as a result of official process of negotiation and the 
commitment to unilateral actions with the purpose of strengthening the ability 
to exercise authority through various institutional changes taken by the me-
tropolitan and de-facto states are thus also means in the politics of secession 
and counter-secession that lead to process of escalation. These changes affect 
the governance arena of political order that is sustained by institutions in both 
metropolitan and de-facto states, where the governing bodies and civil service 
of each party are responsible for guaranteeing social control through the 
provision of services for the population. Whereas in the case of most divided 
communities we can talk of local governance and the sub-national arena, in 
the case of de-facto states, the pursuit of independence and re-integration with 
other states provides ways of reinterpretation of the sub-national level. 
Decisions are taken with the purpose of moving away from localised forms of 
institutionalisation and public service delivery often plays the role of solidi-
fying a different form of identity. It is indeed the public service delivery that 
constitutes the core aspect of action within this arena, with actors from both 
sides striving to legislate towards issues affecting the population. In the 
governance arena, the service delivery in both entities is crucial in con-
solidating an interactive relationship between central government and de- 
facto states. Whereas the former seeks to consolidate its policies through the 
build-up of reintegration institutions that can reach out towards the popu-
lation of the de-facto states with alternative policies, the latter is concerned 
with the consolidation of its executive institutions that can deliver extensive 
social control over a certain part of the territory. 
The security arena 
Finally, the politics of secession and counter-secession take place in the se-
curity arena, where the antagonism between security forces belonging to 
metropolitan and de-facto states can vary, depending on the level of force 
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used to achieve territorial control. Indeed, in this arena the law enforcement 
actors of both sides deal with the maintenance of territorial control through 
the use of force. Security dominates post-conflict environments and what is 
specific about security under conditions of incomplete secession is that control 
over territory is often paramount for the creation and existence of de-facto 
states. The creation of de-facto borders and their maintenance play a crucial 
role in consolidating a parallel exercise of authority for longer periods of time. 
Alongside negotiating a political deal and providing services for their re-
spective populations, the maintenance of security represents an additional 
goal of metropolitan and de-facto states. Security as an additional arena 
where authority is being exercised provides additional opportunities for in-
teraction between the metropolitan and de-facto states and has been in-
stitutionalised in the aftermath of ceasefires. As mentioned above, escalatory 
dynamics can be observed in the three arenas of political order, shifting the 
nature of political interactions from reciprocity to rivalry and hostility or 
indeed witnessing the changing nature of governance arrangements from 
more collaborative types in the aftermath of war to clashing institutional 
layouts like in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In this context the 
security arena should not be neglected as it has been gradually transformed in 
all three cases under discussion from a domain in which antagonism has taken 
the form of dispute to a violent arena in which crises has often dominated the 
interactions between metropolitan and de-facto states. As the second part of 
this book will illustrate, post-conflict political order in the Republic of 
Moldova and Georgia have undergone distinctive patterns of escalation. 
Whilst in Transnistria, evidence suggests the increase in the level of intensity 
in this functional domain has left the two parties engaged solely in violent 
crises as the highest form of antagonism; the other two cases illustrate a 
deeper change in the relationship between metropolitan and de-facto states 
with severe crises occurring in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
The levels of intensity of antagonism 
As explored above, the three functional domains of political order allow for 
an understanding of separate areas in which the exercise of authority under 
conditions of incomplete secession takes place. Whilst decision-making in 
each arena is undertaken by the leaders, institutions and security forces of 
both the metropolitan and de-facto states, being part of the politics of se-
cession and counter secession, it should be noted that these policies are inter- 
connected, part of an action-reaction process that produces escalation be-
tween different levels of intensity of antagonism that ranges from mutual 
accommodation to chronic stalemate and acute confrontation. This ap-
proach relies on the observation that: 
the popular focus on acute conflict, or the violent peak in the trajectory of 
a conflict, risks overlooking the chronic nature of many contemporary 
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ethnonational and civil conflicts. These long-lasting conflicts are often 
deeply embedded within societal structures. They may experience occa-
sional violent upsurges, but a more common backdrop is of inter-group 
hostility that does not escalate into direct violence.                                                                      
Ginty, 2006, p. 59  
Thus, one can look at the second dimension of political order in order to 
grasp the fact that change between different levels of intensity in the inter-
actions between metropolitan and de-facto states affects all three arenas and 
presents fluctuation between mutual accommodation, chronic stalemate and 
acute confrontation. Defining these levels of intensity alongside a continuum 
between cooperation and conflict is useful for understanding the way in 
which changes in the intensity of antagonism within each arena contribute to 
the process of escalation. 
Mutual accommodation 
The first level of intensity of political order under conditions of incomplete 
secession is represented by mutual accommodation. In the political arena, 
mutual accommodation is manifested through a type of interaction by which 
metropolitan and de-facto states seek to resolve their incompatibility by 
taking part in status negotiations. When this level of intensity is present in the 
political arena the two parties can pursue their interests with regards to en-
during incompatibilities through cooperation in conflict resolution. This 
usually takes the form of a constitutional agreement that gives increased 
powers to the de-facto state, usually under a federal or confederal agreement. 
With these negotiations in place, it is expected that the challenges to statehood 
sustained by the de-facto state are limited to the official channel of negotia-
tions, with a view of maximising political gains. For example, in the case of 
Transnistria, the period between 1997 and 2003 has been guided by the ex-
istence of political agreements towards federalisation, with the Kozak 
Memorandum representing the primary proposal for conflict (Vahl et al., 
2004). With these negotiations in place, the actions of the de-facto state were 
limited to institutional build-up and no real political action was taken towards 
independence. The participation in status talks was regular and the possibility 
for resolution existed within the official negotiation framework. Following the 
failure of the Kozak Memorandum, Transnistria abandoned official nego-
tiations and organised a referendum for independence. 
When mutual accommodation is the level of intensity in antagonism be-
tween the parties, at a governance level, various mechanisms and negotiating 
frameworks are in place, with the purpose of guaranteeing cooperation 
between the parties seeking to consolidate service provision for their po-
pulation. Throughout the same period, in the Moldovan-Transnistrian case, 
the parties agreed on establishing several arrangements towards the exercise 
of governance authority through shared responsibilities related to the 
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functioning of public education institutions in the security zone, facilitation 
of law enforcement, economic and monetary activities as well as regulation 
of customs activity, transport and communication between the two (Vahl 
et al., 2004). 
Indeed, mutual accommodation occurs when governance arrangements 
are negotiated as a result of political elites’ willingness to pursue internal 
legitimacy through reciprocity and where overall agreement among political 
forces in both metropolitan and de-facto states guarantees the pursuit of 
moderate strategies towards the opposing party. The primary aim for each 
entity is to consolidate authority and legitimacy over political rule in its part 
of the state’s territory 
Finally, at this level of intensity a low level of violence is often the result of 
mediation frameworks that guarantee working relations between the law 
enforcement agencies of the sides that share information with regards to the 
security situation in the contested areas as a result of the efforts of inter-
national or regional peacekeeping missions. One example of how this par-
ticular level of intensity has affected the security domain of political order 
can be found in the interactions between Georgia and Abkhazia and 
Georgia and South Ossetia in the immediate aftermath of ceasefire. For 
example, as this book will show, in the case of Abkhazia, the UN Mission 
had established particular channels of cooperation with Abkhazia in terms 
of providing safety and subsistence to the inhabitants as well as facilitating 
smooth travel across the de-facto border. In South Ossetia, the creation of a 
Joint Control Commission – a peacekeeping mechanisms established in the 
immediate aftermath of the secessionist conflict- that organised the inter-
actions between security actors also brought with it an initial period of 
stability. This meant that the level of the use of force between the sides was 
kept at minimum as the JCC dealt with the criminal violence present in the 
conflict zone. It is often the case as it will be shown in the case study analysis 
of the book that this particular level of intensity of antagonism can be 
observed in the security arena when interactions between metropolitan and 
de-facto states in this functional domain take the form of disputes. 
Chronic stalemate 
A different level of intensity is represented by chronic stalemate that man-
ifests through the separate actions undertaken by political elites with regards 
to status in the political arena. At this level of intensity in antagonism the 
exercise of authority between the two parties is structured through the riv-
alry in the political arena, competitive institutional arrangements for service 
provision and antagonist interactions in the form of non-violent crises. 
Rivalry in the political arena refers to the separate actions undertaken by 
political elites with regards to status. Among the most important decisions 
one should look at referenda or elections initiated by de-facto states as well 
as the abandoning of official status proposals that often produce deadlocked 
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political negotiation over status for the secessionist territory. It is common 
that the political aims of the parties are strengthened by renewed commit-
ments to their sovereignty and national identity that may produce a broader 
degree of internal political transformation and institutional change, often 
prolonging the conditions of incomplete secession. These changes bring 
about a broadening of the initial conflict to include a wide range of activities 
that affect the lives of people living in the border zone, also provoking in-
creased public debate over the settlement issue. When parties experience this 
level of intensity in antagonism, this often leads to deadlocked political 
negotiation over status for the secessionist territory 
This level of intensity also assumes that in order to exercise authority in 
the governance arena, alternative institutions for service provision can be 
created on the territory of the de-facto state. Finally, when chronic stalemate 
as a level of intensity can be observed as affecting the security arena, dif-
ferent types of actions are carried out in the politics of secession and 
counter-secession leading to both non-violent and violent crises. Tense re-
lations between the parties can reach a turning-point from where the use of 
force may become more likely. One should therefore note the propensity of 
security architectures to be involved in violent crisis as a level of antagonism 
that takes the form of threats to resort to the use of force or the use of 
physical or military force sporadically. Unlike mutual accommodation, 
where bilateral relations are based on cooperation, chronic stalemate in-
volves a gradual shift to competition between the two parties as they seek to 
consolidate their bargaining positions. Non-violent crises such as those 
provoked by economic sanctions may characterise the process of competi-
tion over arrangements for service provisions. Institutional design and leg-
islation towards the provision of services seeks to consolidate the legitimacy 
and governance capacity of the parties and it is common that parties engage 
in siege, sanctions, maiming or territorial or resource appropriation. Whilst 
sanctions have been a tool used by metropolitan states, the other aspects are 
characteristic of the actions carried out by de-facto states as part of their 
politics of secession. In the case of Moldova and Transnistria this has in-
volved appropriation of telecommunication infrastructure in the east by the 
de-facto state, the detention of Moldovan citizens in Transnistria as well as 
economic sanctions by the Moldovan government against the regime in 
Tiraspol. In the Georgian-South Ossetian chronic stalemate has involved 
mainly violent crisis related to the curbing of criminality in the regions and 
most often the curbing of illicit arrangements for service provision. 
Acute confrontation 
Finally, acute confrontation represents an escalation of the intensity level 
characteristic of chronic stalemate and thus the security arena is affected by 
an increase in violence that can involve severe border clashes and ceasefire 
breaches understood as severe crises. In the governance arena, institutional 
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clashes take place as it was the case in South Ossetia with the consolidation 
of parallel administrative systems. Not least, in the political arena this 
particular level of intensity can render negotiations over status obsolete. The 
level of contention in the political arena increases from rivalry to hostility, as 
the political forces in both metropolitan and de-facto states abandon poli-
tical talks in favour of de-legitimising the other side through unilateral status 
proposals and legislation. An increase in the level of intensity of antagonism 
to reach acute confrontation may be initiated by either side, but the chances 
of war are shaped by the consolidation of power relations in favour of one of 
the parties as well as the different legitimacy constraints and opportunities 
faced by the leaders of metropolitan and de-facto states. For example, the 
newly elected Georgia government after the 2004 elections benefited from 
increased popular legitimacy that sustained its actions against the de-facto 
state. 
Escalation and the politics of secession and counter-secession 
It is this multifaceted approach to the study of political order that provides a 
better understanding of the two ways in which escalation occurs in the 
context of incomplete secession Political order is characterised by the two 
different dimensions that fluctuate over time and in different contexts. On 
the one hand one should consider the way in which the first dimension is 
represented by three different functional domains in which the interactions 
between metropolitan and de-facto states take place. A multiplicity of actors 
belonging to the two entities contribute to the implementation of the politics 
of secession and counter-secession through various actions in the political, 
governance and security arenas. This dimension illuminates the way in 
which the exercise of authority under conditions of incomplete secession 
touches upon issues such as status proposals, the provision of essential 
services for the population as well as the maintenance of security. 
Whilst these arenas exhibit markers of continuity in the study of political 
order as the politics of secession and counter-secession have evolved over 
time to affect these functional domains, the changing aspects that should be 
noted with regards to the relationship between the two entities are closely 
linked to the level of intensity in the antagonism sustained within each of 
these arenas. As both the metropolitan and de-facto state have come to 
develop their own institutions for the exercise of authority, the way in which 
secession and counter-secession have come to be implemented has involved a 
fluctuation between more accommodating policies to more confrontational 
types of actions. 
The emphasis on escalation through the concept political order replaces 
the ‘frozen conflict’ terminology by shifting the focus from the analysis of 
conflict to that of these two different types of politics. As the rest of the book 
shows these represent the starting points for action towards the exercise of 
authority taken by de-facto states and metropolitan states respectively. Each 
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of the entities is thus left with developing a strategic type of politics that 
takes into account the political arena where elites negotiate status proposals, 
the governance arena where service provision by each entity is in-
stitutionalised and the security arena that assumes various levels in the use 
or non-use of force by security personnel involved in delivering territorial 
control. Both the politics of secession and the politics of counter-secession 
can be implemented through violent and non-violent means, thus pointing 
towards the way in which the actions of both metropolitan and de-facto 
states in each functional domain can contribute to an increase in the level of 
intensity of antagonism. 
Among non-violent means in the politics of secession one can include the 
passing of legislation towards independence and the build-up of institutions 
to compete with the power of the metropolitan states as well as the orga-
nisation of independence referenda. In the politics of counter-secession the 
non-violent means include equally important legislation that regulates the 
existence of the de-facto state as well as the provision of governance ar-
rangements alternative to those of the de-facto state that are meant to obtain 
territorial reintegration. Indeed, another method is represented by the 
strengthening of domestic institutions that seek to obtain reintegration. 
Finally, if considering the use of force with the purpose of reintegration in 
the case of counter-secessionist policies as well as the way in which violence 
is used to maintain or increase territorial control in the politics of secession, 
one has a clear picture of the way in which these two types of politics in-
teract under conditions of incomplete secession across the three arenas of 
political order. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided conceptual innovation through an original ana-
lytical framework for understanding post-conflict political order in contexts 
of incomplete secession, by specifically focusing on the original categories 
that describe the change in the level of intensity of antagonism between the 
metropolitan and de-facto states across functional domains. These levels of 
intensity can be understood on a cooperation to conflict continuum as 
taking the form of mutual accommodation, chronic stalemate and acute 
confrontation. Thus, the first level of intensity of political order under 
conditions of incomplete secession is represented by mutual accommoda-
tion. In the political arena, mutual accommodation manifests itself through 
a type of interaction by which metropolitan and de-facto states seek to re-
solve their incompatibility by taking part in status negotiations. When this 
level of intensity is present in the political arena the two parties can pursue 
their interests with regards to enduring incompatibilities through coopera-
tion in conflict resolution. When mutual accommodation is the level of in-
tensity in antagonism between the parties, at a governance level, various 
mechanisms and negotiating frameworks are in place, with the purpose of 
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guaranteeing cooperation between the parties seeking to consolidate service 
provision for their population, keeping the use of force in the security arena 
at a minimum. A different level of intensity is represented by chronic sta-
lemate that manifests itself through the separate actions undertaken by 
political elites with regards to status in the political arena. Among the most 
important decisions one should look at this chapter considers referenda or 
elections initiated by de- facto states as well as the abandoning of official 
status proposals that often produce deadlocked political negotiation over 
status for the secessionist territory. This level of intensity also assumes that 
in order to exercise authority in the governance arena, alternative institu-
tions for service provision can be created on the territory of the de-facto 
state. Furthermore, when chronic stalemate as a level of intensity can be 
observed as affecting the security arena, different types of actions are carried 
out in the politics of secession and counter-secession leading to both non- 
violent and violent crises. Finally, acute confrontation represents an esca-
lation from the intensity level characteristic of chronic stalemate and thus 
the security arena is affected by an increase in violence that can involve 
severe border clashes and ceasefire breaches understood as severe crises. In 
the governance arena, institutional clashes take place with the consolidation 
of parallel administrative systems. Not least, in the political arena this level 
of intensity can render negotiations over status obsolete, making the poli-
tical arena a functional domain in which increased antagonism between the 
sides represents one specific aspect of escalation in political order. In the 
context variation in the levels of intensity of antagonism in the political, 
governance and security arenas that constitutes the focus of the book – this 
chapter has discussed the process of escalation in post-conflict political 
order, inviting further inquiry into the potential causes behind these dy-
namics, an aspect that will be explored in more detail in the third part of 
this book. 
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